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Abstract
With the ubiquitous use of mobile devices, locationbased services (LBS) have rapidly pervaded daily life.
By providing context- and location-specific information,
LBS enable a myriad of opportunities for individuals
and organizations. However, the manifold advantages
come along with a radical increase in location privacy
concerns and non-transparent data flows between the
various actors involved. While research often focuses on
protecting the dyadic relation between the user and LBS
provider, the entirety of dark sides constituting privacy
violations remains hidden. In this paper, we follow the
paradigm of architectural thinking to shed light on the
diverse dark sides emerging in today’s LBS. By drawing
on a multiple case study and developing a notation for
architectural maps that help understand LBS from a
socio-technical and privacy-oriented perspective, we
reveal six dark side archetypes of LBS.

1. Introduction
The worldwide spread of mobile devices along with
technological advances that enable accurately locating a
user’s or object’s position has led to a rapid increase in
location-based services (LBS) [1]. Often realized via
mobile applications, LBS provide information tailored
to the location and context of a user [2]. While in the past
LBS were primarily used for navigation purposes, their
scope has been expanded to social networking (e.g.,
locating friends), advertising (e.g., promotional alerts),
healthcare (e.g., fitness monitoring) and other domains
(e.g., weather forecast) [2, 3]. In fact, the global LBS
market size was valued at $36.2 billion in 2019 and is
predicted to reach $157.3 billion by 2026 [4].
Although LBS offer several advantages, they require
people to disclose their location, personal preferences,
and the context they are currently facing [1, 2, 5]. In
addition, LBS often come at the cost of sharing one’s
private identity and location data with untrusted or even
unknown third parties, raising serious privacy concerns
[6]. These concerns refer, for example, to the disclosure
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of visited locations or daily habits [2, 6]. While service
providers declare they process and share personal data
only in an aggregated and non-identifiable form, the idea
that personal data can successfully be anonymized is
controversially discussed [3, 7]. Indeed, in a 2019 study,
researchers were able to correctly re-identify 99.98% of
participants in an anonymized dataset [7]. In this regard,
location data can be considered as particularly privacycritical by acting as a quasi-identifier of users through a
sequence of spatio-temporal constraints [6, 8]. Recently,
as part of its long-term privacy project, The New York
Times published a special issue on the threat posed by
LBS, highlighting how easily people can be identified
by only using location data, i.e., without identifiers like
user’s Ad ID or phone number [9]. Identifying a person
requires only four time-stamped location records [10].
LBS research has created a large body of knowledge
on privacy-enhancing technologies and privacy threat
models, and a plethora of algorithms and methods to
prevent inference attacks [1, 3, 6, 8]. However, scholars
claim that most studies focus on the dyadic relationship
between the user and service provider, leading to a lack
of transparency about socio-technical relations between
the various actors participating in LBS and a missing
understanding of the associated diversity of dark sides
that may impair user’s location privacy [2, 11, 12]. In
addition, both information systems (IS) and privacy
researchers call for more design science orientation to
provide approaches that help different practitioners (e.g.,
app developers, policy makers) capture the complexity
of data sharing mechanisms today and enable a common
understanding of privacy-related dark sides [11, 13].
Against this background, in this paper we aim to shed
light on the heterogeneity of dark sides affecting location
privacy as well as on the underlying determinants. For
this purpose, we draw on the paradigm of architectural
thinking [14, 15] to decompose LBS from both a sociotechnical and privacy-oriented perspective. Having its
origin in the enterprise architecture management (EAM),
architectural thinking is a rather lightweight approach
that seeks to support researchers and practitioners in
understanding complex causalities through architectural

Page 6651

maps that visualize socio-technical elements and their
relations in a simplified form [16]. Following a design
science approach [17], we develop a notation for LBSrelated architectural maps and use this notation as a
means to identify privacy-related dark sides. Moreover,
we classify these dark sides into archetypes representing
recurring practices of privacy violation. We argue that
exploring LBS from an architectural perspective reveals
causalities for privacy-related dark sides at a detailed
socio-technical level and assists both researchers and
practitioners in various tasks related to location privacy
(e.g., legal judgment of specific LBS). Therefore, our
study deals with the following research question:
Which archetypes of privacy-related dark sides can
be identified in location-based services by taking an
architectural perspective?
To answer this research question, we conduct an
explorative multiple case study [18] of privacy-critical
cases related to LBS, which are widely reported in the
public media. By collecting and analyzing data on these
cases, we first develop the notation and then apply it to
identify dark side archetypes in the field of LBS.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In the next section, we summarize literature relevant to
our research context. Then, we present our methodology
and continue with a description of our results. Finally,
we discuss our results and give a conclusion.

2. Related research
We identified three streams of related research. The
first stream points out definitions, types, and elements
of LBS. The second stream describes location privacy
and related main areas of research, but also introduces
dark sides and archetypes. The third stream differentiates
architectural thinking from EAM and outlines models
for extending architectural maps through a privacy lens.

2.1 Location-based services
In recent years, the availability and use of LBS has
increased significantly [1, 4]. Roughly defined, LBS are
“services that take the user’s current or past location as
input to provide a service” [11, p. 148]. Other authors
concretize the activities performed by LBS, defining
them as “services that create, compile, select, or filter
information based on the current locations of the users
or those of other persons or mobile objects” [19, p. 214].
While the first definition is rather simple and lacks a
specification of relevant entities, the second definition
does not consider past location data. Abbas et al. define
LBS as “an application that combines the location or
position of a mobile device associated with a given
entity (individual or object) together with contextual

information, to offer a value added service and/or fulfil
a particular need for the user across a wireless network”
[20, p. 3]. Our work follows this definition, because it
considers the context of a service as an aspect essential
to judge privacy compliance of LBS [20, 21].
The literature suggests several criteria for classifying
LBS. In the first instance, it can be distinguished between
push-based LBS, where location-related information is
proactively provided to the user when a specific event
occurs, and pull-based LBS, where users directly request
location-related information [19, 22]. In addition, LBS
can be classified into single-target (tracking the position
of a certain target) or multi-target LBS (interrelating the
positions of many targets) and outdoor or indoor LBS [2,
19]. Küpper and Treu list further classifications [19].
The LBS value chain is realized by the interaction of
various social and technical elements. While the former
embody the different actors in LBS, such as users, LBS
providers, developers, network operators, and content
providers [5, 11, 19], the latter refer to the underlying
information technology (IT), including devices (e.g.,
smartphones), communication networks (e.g., wireless
local and cellular networks), positioning components
(e.g., global positioning system (GPS)), and software
(e.g., operating systems) [3, 5, 11]. The LBS value chain
is unique insofar as a single provider is unable to make
a complete offering to customers, leading to an interorganizational matter, i.e., a situation where multi-actor
collaboration is crucial [20]. Moreover, as LBS are used
in dynamic and mobile environments, they are aware of
the context their users are in and accordingly customize
the content and presentation of information [23].

2.2 Location privacy and dark side archetypes
Research on location privacy is gaining increasing
importance. As a subset of information privacy, which is
“the ability of the individual to control the terms under
which personal information is acquired and used” [22,
p. 138], location privacy refers to “the capability of the
target person to exercise control about who may access
her location information in which situation and in which
level of detail” [19, p. 233]. Wang and Liu stress three
unique characteristics of location privacy, which impose
major research challenges [8]. First, requirements for
location privacy are inherently user-dependent (e.g.,
some users regard their location as private, while others
care about service quality). Second, there is a trade-off
between location privacy and utility (e.g., more precise
location data leads to higher service quality). Third,
location data is updated frequently and processed in real
time, bearing the risk of inferring user locations [8].
In IS research, most studies on location privacy focus
on the development of technical mechanisms to prevent
different types of attacks [3, 6, 8]. Based on their target,
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these attacks can be classified into identity attacks (e.g.,
de-anonymization of users by their address) and location
attacks (e.g., exposure of regularly visited places) [5]. As
a counterpart, location privacy preserving mechanisms
include cryptographic methods (e.g., encryption of user
positions), anonymization techniques (e.g., suppression
and generalization to achieve k-anonymity), as well as
obfuscation (e.g., dummy locations mask true positions)
[1, 5, 6]. While these attacks and mechanisms usually
refer to the dyadic relation between a user and malicious
actor, the complexity of privacy violations in today’s
LBS requires exploring the manifold dark sides that are
unwittingly triggered by users or appear in different data
sharing practices of socio-technical elements [11, 20].
Dark sides can be defined as “‘negative’ phenomena
that are associated with the use of IT, and that have the
potential to infringe the well-being of individuals,
organizations, and societies” [24, p. 161]. In our context,
we also understand dark sides as privacy-critical actions
or mechanisms in LBS that are hidden to or not expected
by actors, especially users, and are part of or constitute
a privacy violation. Classifying archetypes that are “a
very typical example of a certain person or thing” [25],
can help identify recurring patterns of dark sides causing
a privacy violation. Therefore, we use the term dark side
archetype to describe typical examples of how multiple
dark sides in combination or in a specific sequence lead
to a violation of location privacy. Archetypes are special
as they do not only occur in one case, but can be found
across multiple cases. Schilling et al. explicitly call for
increased attention to archetypes in IS research [26]. To
identify the archetypes, we consider both the context and
sequence in which dark sides appear in a case. While the
literature outlines types of privacy violations in LBS,
such as location-based advertising or profiling, there is
a lack of knowledge about the specific causalities [12].

2.3 Architectural maps and privacy models
Architecture comprises “the fundamental concepts
or properties of a system in its environment embodied
in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its
design and evolution” [27, p. 2]. The architecture of an
enterprise has business, software, and hardware layers,
and is managed by the EAM, which seeks to improve
business IT alignment and transparency [15]. For this,
EAM refers to enterprise architecture (EA) models that
address specific stakeholder concerns [14]. A prevalent
EA modeling language is ArchiMate, which proposes
several elements and relations to structure the EA [28].
However, recent studies claim that EAM is mainly
used by IT experts and is rather formal [14, 15]. Thus,
EAM should evolve to architectural thinking as a more
pragmatic approach performable by non-architects [14].
Instead of providing complex EA models, architectural

thinking builds upon architectural maps that visualize
socio-technical elements and relations in a simple form
[16]. Thereby, critical causalities can be highlighted and
discussed by different types of decision-makers [14, 16].
So far, architectural maps have only been proposed
at the enterprise level in form of strategic theme maps,
capability maps, or value stream maps, but not in the
inter-organizational privacy context [16]. Closest to such
architectural maps are privacy models that classify the
different actors involved in data sharing networks [11,
20, 29]. For example, Conger et al.’s model suggests
differing between first, second, third, and fourth parties
[29]. In the context of LBS, a few models cover some
technical elements like LBS servers or mobile devices
[3, 5]. However, all these models focus on explaining
the actors that are generally interacting in LBS, but do
capture neither the concrete socio-technical relations nor
the related dark sides causing privacy violations in LBS.
Summing up, IS research on location privacy often
focuses on technically improving the security between
users and LBS providers, but is lacking a comprehensive
understanding of the various dark sides, especially those
caused by third parties, that lead to privacy violations.
Moreover, pragmatic approaches are missing that enable
visualizing socio-technical relations and dark sides in
LBS. By addressing our research question, we aim to
contribute to this research gap and support researchers
and practitioners in performing different tasks related to
location privacy, such as case analysis or legal judgment.

3. Methodology
In our study, we followed a design science oriented
research approach [17]. We developed a notation for
architectural maps that visualize LBS from both a sociotechnical and privacy perspective as a means to identify
dark side archetypes currently emerging in LBS. In a
multiple case study [18], we identified the modeling
elements for the notation exploratory while searching
for criteria to classify the archetypes. We evaluated the
notation in a focus group and modeled all cases to verify
the archetypes. Figure 1 shows the steps of our study.
Data collection Data analysis
1) Initial
collection of
privacycritical cases
of LBS
2) Cleansing
of case study
database and
collection of
documents

3) Exposure
of dark side
archetypes
Cycle 1:
Deduction,
induction
Cycle 2:
Axial coding
Cycle 3:
Selective
coding

Development

Evaluation

4) Design of
notation for
architectural
maps using
ArchiMate

5) Evaluation
of notation in
a focus group
(business, IT,
law actors)

6) Revision
of notation
by simplified
syntax and
visualization

7) Modeling
of all cases
to verify the
notation and
archetypes

Figure 1. Methodology
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3.1 Data collection

Cleansing of case study database

Initial collection

In the initial collection of privacy-critical cases, we
followed a theoretical replication logic [18] where cases
are selected to predict contradictory results. We hereby
intended to cover a high variety of cases. Privacy-critical
in our sense are cases reporting on a misuse of location
data or a threat to location privacy caused by an LBS
provider, but not cyberattacks or IT security incidents.
Figure 2 shows our process of case selection. In the first
step, we searched for news articles on four widespread
news platforms (CNet, The Guardian, The New York
Times, and ZDNet). We used the search term “Privacy
AND Location OR GPS” and considered a publication
period from January 2018 to May 2020, resulting in
1308 potential cases (n is the number of cases, i.e., in
steps 1 and 2 every news article could have represented
a suitable case). In the second step, we read the title of
all news articles in our filter and, if applicable, their
abstract. While we recorded 212 articles describing an
eligible privacy-critical case in a case study database
[18], we excluded the others. For example, we had to
exclude hundreds of articles reporting on cyberattacks
or security updates. In the third step, we studied the 212
articles, removed those not focusing on location data,
and removed duplicates by assigning articles reporting
on the same scandal to a unique case number, resulting
in 29 cases. In the fourth step, we collected additional
data material on each case, such as official responses
from accused LBS providers, by conducting a backward
search using the links in the articles. In the fifth step, we
aggregated the data material per case and excluded eight
cases exhibiting insufficient or inaccurate information.
Following our aim of identifying archetypes, in the sixth
step we switched to a literal replication logic [18] and
selected those cases predicted to provide similar results
by comparing their content and considering their impact.
1. News articles identified by platform searching (n = 1308)
CNet (476), Guardian (237), NY Times (290), ZDNet (305)
2. Screening of articles by reading title and abstract (n = 212)
CNet (82), Guardian (36), NY Times (51), ZDNet (43)
3. Case assignment and further exclusion of articles by detailed
reading and duplicate removal across platforms (n = 29)
4. Collection of additional data material (e.g., blog entries) per
case by backward search via the links in each article (n = 29)
5. Aggregation of data material per case and exclusion of cases
exhibiting insufficient or inaccurate information (n = 21)
6. Selection of similar cases by comparing their content and
considering their impact (n = 15)

Figure 2. Process of case selection

Table 1 lists the data material collected for the final 15
cases, together with a link to an exemplary news article.
In total, we collected 83 news articles, 9 blog entries, 19
tweets, 4 official responses, 2 studies, and 7 technical
reports throughout the cases. The diversity of documents
allowed us to triangulate data per case and thus increase
the reliability and validity of our study [18].
Table 1. Data material collected per case
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Description
N B T O S R Link
Strava leaked secret army bases
7 1 2
1 Link
MoviePass tracked user locations 4
1 1
1 Link
Kids gaming apps share user data 6 2
1
Link
Polar leaked soldiers’ location data 5
1
Link
GasBuddy sells data to Reveal Mobile 7 1 1
Link
Weather Channel app amasses data 6
1
Link
Mobile carriers sold location data 7 1 3
2 Link
AccuWeather shared location data 11 1 2 1 1
Link
Shutterfly collects visits via photos 3
1 Link
Netflix’s Android app tracked users 3
1
Link
Pokémon GO data used for profiling 7 1 2
Link
TikTok accused of sharing user data 5 2 4 1
Link
Family locator Life360 shares data 4
Link
Ring’s Neighbors leaks location data 5
2
1 Link
Care19 app shares sensitive user data 3
1 Link
Σ 83 9 19 4 2 7
Legend: N = news article, B = blog entry, T = tweet, O = official
response, S = study, R = technical report

3.2 Data analysis
To identify dark side archetypes and related sociotechnical elements across the 15 cases, we conducted a
qualitative content analysis of the data material [30] via
MAXQDA. We followed Saldaña’s advice that multiple
coding cycles constitute a rigorous data analysis [30], as
we performed three coding cycles. In the first cycle, we
combined deduction and induction. We set up a coding
agenda [30] consisting of a priori codes we deductively
received from the literature. These codes included LBS’
basic elements (e.g., devices, users) [3, 5, 11, 19], actors
and relations highlighted by privacy models (e.g., fourth
parties) [11, 29], and key aspects for assessing privacy
violations (e.g., context change) [21, 22]. As induction
also enabled an open coding of the content, we refined
our coding agenda with several codes we identified that
were not covered by the selected literature. For example,
in many cases software development kits (SDK) and data
aggregators were considered as malicious elements, but
also privacy-critical actions of LBS providers like user
profiling. In the second coding cycle, we reviewed and
reorganized the codes we received from induction and
deduction by using axial coding. As the coding cycle
evolved, we combined the codes into broader, themefocused categories [30]. For example, while we assigned
the codes “user” and “LBS provider” to the category
“actors”, we categorized “augmented reality game” and
“SDK” as “applications”. In the third coding cycle, we

Page 6654

Applications Actors
IT infrastructure
Relations

Based on the identified socio-technical elements and
relations constituting dark sides in LBS, we developed a
notation for deriving architectural maps that seek to help
researchers and practitioners understand privacy-critical
cases at first glance. For the maps’ layout, we used the
categories from our axial coding as layers and referred
to the syntax and graphical notation of ArchiMate [28].
Adding an actor layer was especially important to ensure
an inter-organizational perspective. To demonstrate and
evaluate the notation in a focus group, we exemplarily
modeled architectural maps for the cases 8 and 11, since
these are described as particularly privacy-critical and
exhibit different characteristics. The focus group session
was attended by three lawyers, two executives, one IT
expert, and one researcher. Together we discussed the
usability and utility of the maps. Regarding usability,
the participants highly appreciated the layered structure
and simplicity of the maps. However, since ArchiMate’s
original notation looks slightly formal, they suggested
integrating icons to distinguish the modeling elements
more clearly and using different line styles to clarify the
multiple types of relations. Regarding utility, the experts
approved that lightweight visualizations, such as our
architectural maps, are urgently needed to make privacy
violations comprehensible in a simple form. Especially
the lawyers emphasized the lack of such visualizations
in the legal literature, since they provide a valuable basis
for discussing complex causalities. After improving the
notation in line with the evaluation results, we modeled
all 15 cases to verify the notation’s completeness. By
comparing the modeled relations for similarity, we were
also able to validate the correct assignment of each case
to one of the six archetypes.
Table 2 lists the modeling elements of our notation.
Following the claim that architectural thinking is rather
lightweight, our notation covers those socio-technical
elements and relations necessary to give an overview of
privacy-related dark sides in LBS. Hence, architectural
maps derived from our notation are not intended to give
details of internal data processing, for example. The
notation suggests modeling elements distributed across
actors, applications, and IT infrastructure layers, as well
as their different types of relations, such as data flows.
The dark side element fulfills two functions: it describes
a privacy-critical action and allows the tracing of a case
by specifying a sequence. Timers additionally indicate
the frequency with which a dark side occurs.

Element

Dark Sides

3.3 Development and evaluation

Table 2. Notation for architectural maps of LBS

Clusters

used selective coding to reveal cause-effect patterns in
the data material [30]. For each case, we interlinked the
categories and codes across the text passages to identify
the relations constituting dark sides. By comparing the
dark sides across the cases, we revealed six archetypes.

Description
Covers users and LBS providers, but
Actor
also other (malicious) parties involved,
such as data aggregators or advertisers.
Embodies applications, such as mobile
Software
apps providing LBS and operating
systems of devices.
Shows SDKs provided by third parties.
SDK
SDKs are used to enhance applications
by functions pre-defined in a package.
Represents mobile devices of users,
Device
including smartphones, tablets,
wearables, and others.
Shows servers of LBS providers or
third parties. Comprises technical
Server
entities like databases and is especially
used for data analytics purposes.
Illustrates any kind of data transmission
Data flow
between elements.
Shows whether an element has granted
Permission
permission or not.
Specifies any other type of relation like
Other
ownership or integration of elements.
Describes a dark side caused by an
Dark side
element. Dark sides are bound to
relations and sequenced by (n).
Indicates the frequency with which a
Timer
specific dark side occurs.
Shows the actors, applications, and IT
Layer
infrastructure layers.
Clusters elements and reduces the
Container
number of relations needed.

Icon

4. Results
While each case has unique characteristics, taking a
socio-technical perspective in the data analysis revealed
common dark sides across the 15 cases. By comparing
the context and sequence in which the dark sides occur,
we identified six dark side archetypes that represent
prevalent violations of location privacy in LBS. We
present each archetype by illustrating the architectural
map of a selected case and explaining the similar cases.

4.1 Leakage of secret locations through publicly
available maps offered by LBS providers
The first archetype is exposed by the cases 1 and 4.
Case 1 refers to Strava, a social network for athletes,
which allows its users to compare, time, and share their
exercises. For this, Strava collects fitness and location
data of running, cycling, and swimming routes via the
Strava mobile app or fitness trackers. Strava offers a
publicly available heat map that shows the activity of its
users all over the world, containing 3 trillion latitude and
longitude points. Military analysts noticed that the heat
map is detailed enough to uncover secret army bases, as
a subset of users are soldiers on duty. While these bases
are invisible in LBS like Google Maps, their layout can
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be seen on Strava’s heat map, where cities are aglow
with jogging routes and foreign army bases in remote
areas stand out as isolated hotspots. The heat map also
reveals which bases are mostly used and which routes
are taken by soldiers. In addition, soldiers can easily be
tracked by cross-referencing their Strava data with other
social media use. According to our analysis, three dark
sides constitute this archetype (see Figure 3). First, most
users (i.e., also soldiers) opt for including their data in
the map, as this is Strava’s default setting. Second, the
map is publicly available and updated monthly. Third,
the map can be misused for various malicious purposes.

However, while apps like GasBuddy can easily be
uninstalled, changing the mobile carrier is cumbersome.
In case 7, the four major mobile carriers AT&T, Sprint,
T-Mobile, and Verizon sold their customers’ real-time
location data received via cell tower usage to the data
aggregators LocationSmart and Zumigo, who resold the
data in a prepared form to advertisers and other actors
like Microbilt, a company that offers phone tracking
services. Figure 4 shows the dark sides of this archetype.
While GasBuddy legitimizes the collection of location
data by its service provision, the mobile carriers lean on
purposes of roadside assistance and fraud prevention. In
this archetype, the first dark side occurs when location
data is sent to a data aggregator without the expectation
of users and out of the context of the service provided.
Next, the data aggregators process the data and then
resell it to fourth parties like advertisers. Last, the fourth
parties influence people based on their location or even
offer controversial phone tracking apps like Microbilt’s
Mobile Device Verify. In this regard, case 7 highlights
another dimension of LBS: they can appear as phone
tracking apps, where the target is not an object like a gas
station, but the location of a specific person’s device.

Figure 3. Architectural map of Strava leaking
secret locations through its heat map (case 1)
The same happened with the fitness app Polar (case
4). For most users who set their data to public, posting
their workouts on Polar’s Explore map is a feature and
not a privacy issue. Even if profiles are set to private,
fitness activities can reveal where users live. Both cases
demonstrate that location privacy not only refers to the
user, but also to critical locations supposed to be secret.

4.2 Unexpected location-based advertising by
sharing location data with data aggregators
The second archetype can be found in the cases 5 and
7. In case 5, the provider of GasBuddy, an app to check
prices of nearby gas stations, sold data on user’s latitude,
longitude, and IP address together with timestamps and
user’s Ad ID, a code that uniquely identifies a particular
person for advertising purposes, to the data aggregation
and location-based marketing company Reveal Mobile.
Reveal Mobile then shared the data with location-based
advertisers, who were able to accurately retrace where
and when users of GasBuddy have been.

Figure 4. Architectural Map of mobile carriers
selling location data (case 7)

4.3 Hidden integration of location-based
services in mobile applications
Regarding the third dark side archetype, users are
unaware that certain mobile apps include some kind of
LBS tracking their location, since location data is not
necessary to fulfill an application’s actual purpose. In
case 2 for example, the former movie ticketing service
MoviePass collected and potentially shared the location
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data of its users with third parties. Users assumed that
MoviePass collected data on ticket sales and movie
choices, rather than detailed location data that allows
tracking users before and after watching a movie. In
addition, they claimed MoviePass did not disclose the
location tracking in their privacy policy. Figure 5 shows
the two dark sides of this archetype. First, users are
tracked without their knowledge or even expectation, as
location data is not necessary to fulfill the actual purpose
of a service. Second, this data then might be sold to third
parties that influence users based on their location.

the AccuWeather app transmitted user’s device data to
Reveal Mobile, which approximated locations of users
based on this data, although the users opted out of giving
access to their location data (see Figure 6). The first dark
side is that Reveal Mobile’s SDK implemented in the
AccuWeather app triggers the collection and transfer of
device data. Next, the AccuWeather app continuously
collects the device’s Bluetooth status and the name and
unique BSSID (basic service set identifier) of the WiFi
router in use from the iOS operating system, and sends
this data to Reveal Mobile every few hours. Aggregating
the data, Reveal Mobile then approximates the location
of users and sells this information to fourth parties.

Figure 5. Architectural map of MoviePass
secretly tracking user locations (case 2)
Other examples for this dark side archetype are given
by the cases 3, 10, and 12. While in case 3 a study found
that 184 kid-targeted apps like Fun Kid Racing secretly
collected and presumably shared GPS data, in case 10
Netflix’s Android app tracked the location of several
users without asking for permission. In case 12, TikTok,
a social video app, is accused in a California lawsuit of
sending personally identifiable user data, such as phone
numbers and location data, to third parties like Appsflyer
and Facebook. The Pentagon even classified TikTok as
a security threat as it is also accused of storing this data
on Chinese servers, which the government could access
under Chinese law. All four cases emphasize that LBS
are secretly integrated into various mobile apps without
being relevant for service provision. They often appear
outside the context of use and without user’s knowledge.

4.4 Approximation of user locations by
aggregating multiple data types
The key characteristic of the fourth archetype is the
determination of the user location by collecting and
aggregating different types of data, even though users
explicitly denied access to their location data. In case 8,

Figure 6. Architectural map of AccuWeather
sending device data to Reveal Mobile (case 8)
In case 9, the photo-editing app Shutterfly defied
user permissions by gleaning precise phone location
data from photos and sending this data to its provider’s
servers. Even though the users denied access to location
data, Shutterfly used the EXIF (exchangeable image file
format) metadata that is generated by cameras and that
integrates GPS coordinates and timestamps into photos.
By aggregating this data, movements of users can be
tracked. Both cases demonstrate that LBS are able to
locate users even without having access to location data.

4.5 Extensive profiling by amassing user’s
location data
The fifth dark side archetype refers to LBS that are
constantly tracking users, even when they are asleep or
are actually not using the service. Based on this data
deluge, LBS providers gain detailed insights about the
life of their customers. A prominent example is Niantic,

Page 6657

the creator of popular mobile augmented reality games
like Pokémon GO and Harry Potter: Wizards Unite, who
amasses location data of its players (case 11). Figure 7
shows the four dark sides our analysis revealed. First,
while players allow Niantic’s games to collect location
data for proper functionality, they do not expect being
tracked with such a high frequency, even when they are
not playing, since this is not clarified in the privacy
statements of the games. Second, the location data is
sent to Niantic’s server. Third, by processing the data,
Niantic can discern individual patterns of user behavior
and details about players, such as the number of calories
they likely burned, the distance they traveled, and the
promotions they engaged with. Some people might also
play multiple games simultaneously, which increases the
variety and precision of insights. Fourth, Niantic sells the
location data and detailed profiles to third parties.

family locator Life360, which is already controversially
discussed because of its child tracking function, collects
not only location data of people, but also, for example,
their driving speed and the battery life of their phones.
The app shares the data with a risk-assessment firm that
uses the data to calculate insurance prices. In case 14, a
study found that the Neighbors app, which allows people
to share video footage and to post on crime in their local
area, leaked locations of devices via GPS coordinates
not supposed to be accessible in any post. Consequently,
exact positions of cameras and addresses of users were
revealed. However, one of the most pressing privacy
issues today is the use of contact tracing or COVID-19
apps. While they play an important role in containing the
virus, there are reports of related privacy concerns like
governmental surveillance. In case 15, a review found
that North and South Dakota’s Care19 app, created by
ProudCrowd, sends data to the advertising and location
technology firm Foursquare. Figure 8 illustrates the dark
sides. First, Care19 has embedded Foursquare’s Pilgrim
SDK that supports apps by converting location data into
concrete names of places, but in this case also triggers
the collection and sharing of a user’s Ad ID. Second,
Care19 collects location data and the Ad ID from the
user’s device. Third, together with a unique citizen code
generated by the app, the data is sent to Foursquare.

Figure 7. Architectural Map of Niantic
amassing location data for profiling (case 11)
Another example is the Weather Company, which is
accused of deceptively using its Weather Channel app to
amass location data by tracking movements in minute
detail, while making users believe their data would only
be used to localize weather reports (case 6). According
to the lawsuit, the company analyzed the data to identify
daily habits, shopping preferences, and even the identity
of users. Then, the profiles and location data were sold.

4.6 Misuse of protective location-based services
The latest reports we found refer to LBS that intend
to provide protection for users, but have been misused
for several purposes. Therefore, we identified the sixth
archetype across the cases 13, 14, and 15. In case 13, the

Figure 8. Architectural Map of Care19 sharing
personal data with Foursquare (case 15)

5. Discussion and conclusion
With the manifold advantages of LBS, an increase
in privacy violations has been reported [9, 10]. Based on
a multiple case study [18], in this paper we shed light on
the diverse dark sides causing privacy violations in LBS.
By following the paradigm of architectural thinking, we
developed a notation for architectural maps that allow
decomposing LBS from a socio-technical perspective
and thereby facilitate understanding the diversity of dark
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sides affecting location privacy. By comparing the dark
sides across 15 privacy-critical cases, we identified six
dark side archetypes emerging in widespread LBS.
The archetypes highlight the various ways in which
privacy violations in LBS can occur. Summarizing the
dark sides per archetype, Table 3 gives an overview of
each archetype’s key characteristics. In comparison,
certain aspects are particularly worth mentioning. First,
it is remarkable that permissions to track user locations
are granted in the archetypes 1, 2, 5, and 6. While users
are unaware of being tracked in archetype 3, they denied
access to location data in archetype 4. Second, third
parties like data aggregators or advertisers are directly
part of the value chain in the archetypes 2, 4, 5, and 6.
While in archetype 1 third parties are not involved in the
value chain, in archetype 3 it is assumed that data is sold
to third parties. Third, in the archetypes 1 and 5, the LBS
providers process location data on a large scale, whereas
they mainly distribute data in the archetypes 2, 4, and 6.
In archetype 3, it is rather unclear to what extent LBS
providers process location data and for what purpose.
Table 3. Key characteristics of the identified
dark side archetypes
Dark side archetype
(1) Leakage of secret
locations through publicly
available maps offered
by LBS providers
(2) Unexpected locationbased advertising by
sharing location data with
data aggregators
(3) Hidden integration of
location-based services in
mobile applications
(4) Approximation of user
locations by aggregating
multiple data types
(5) Extensive profiling
by amassing user’s
location data
(6) Misuse of protective
location-based services

Key characteristics
- No direct involvement of
third parties like advertisers
- Public map allows to infer
sensitive routes and locations
- Data aggregators as central
intermediaries of data sharing
- Frequent context changes lead
to unexpected advertising
- LBS not necessary for service
provision of focal application
- Hidden tracking of users
- Defiance of user permissions
- Location is determined by
combining different data types
- Excessive data collection even
if LBS are not actively used
- Very detailed user profiling
- Protective use of location data
- Misuse of data for different
purposes, such as advertising

Our results contribute to research and practice alike.
From an academic point of view, the notation and maps
complement previous research on modeling privacyrelated elements in LBS. While existing privacy models
often focus on classifying the different actors involved
[11, 20, 29], our notation and related maps reveal dark
sides causing privacy violations in LBS from a holistic
architectural perspective. Moreover, differing between
elements of actors, applications, and IT infrastructure
layers helps understand socio-technical relations in LBS
at a higher level of granularity. Our proposed notation

and architectural maps additionally provide first steps
towards extending architectural thinking, which has so
far been discussed at the intra-organizational level [14,
15, 16], by a multi-actor perspective and to the field of
LBS. Our research also exemplifies how dark sides can
be identified using news articles as a primary data source
and then structured via archetypes [26]. This approach
can be used in other domains to reveal and classify dark
sides. Above all, research often falls short of considering
the various ways in which location privacy is violated.
While many studies focus on anonymizing location data
in the dyadic relation between a user and LBS provider
[3, 6, 8], they often do not take into account the sharing
of additional identifiers like the Ad ID (e.g., archetypes
2 and 6) or the inference of user locations by multiple
data types (e.g., archetype 4). With our archetypes, we
aim to increase sensitivity for the diversity of dark sides
and underline the increasing influence of third parties.
Our results also have several practical implications.
As our research is based on architectural thinking, which
claims to be lightweight and pragmatic, we only included
privacy-related key elements for modeling LBS in the
notation. Due to their simplicity, derived architectural
maps foster a common terminology and understanding
between different types of practitioners. Both business
and regulatory stakeholders can visualize privacy issues
based on our notation and receive a discussion basis. For
example, during the evaluation of our results, lawyers
acknowledged that architectural maps would be useful
for analyzing and debating privacy violations and that
such visualizations are too scarce in the legal literature.
In addition, practitioners like LBS providers can refer to
our maps and archetypes to assess privacy compliance,
but also to gain insights into the various ways in which
location data can be collected, shared, and misused.
The results of our study are not without limitations.
First, we only used 15 privacy-critical cases to identify
the dark side archetypes. Considering more cases may
have revealed further archetypes or led to a breakdown
of those identified. Second, as we used news articles as
a primary data source, some journalistic preconceptions
may have affected the analysis. Nevertheless, according
to Yin, news articles can serve as a source of empirical
evidence [18]. Third, the results give rather an overview
of privacy violations in LBS. An in-depth legal analysis
per case needs to consider further aspects like purpose
limitation [11], the distinction of push and pull services
[22], and the evaluation of contextual integrity [21].
Future research is required to anchor architectural
thinking in the domain of LBS, to improve the notation,
and to complement the archetypes. Moreover, we can
imagine a domain-specific modeling language for LBS
or privacy research based on our notation. We encourage
future research to study data sharing networks of LBS
more intensively and to disclose the depth of dark sides.
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